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I. INTRODUCTION
Gone are the days of working for one employer from cradle to grave. The
average U.S. employee changes jobs at least three times during his or her
working career.1 With the escalation in job changes, employers are
increasingly adding clauses to employee contracts that restrict the employee
from competing with the employer after the working relationship is
terminated.2 A covenant not to compete is often the most crucial clause in an
employment contract,3 because, absent such a clause, the employee may
generally compete directly with his or her former employer4 after the
employment relationship is terminated.5 "
Covenants not to compete are typically found in two situations.6 First,
when a business is sold the buyer will often require that, as part of the sale,
1 Susan C. Schena, Third of Workers Went to a New Job in '90, Survey Says,
SAN Dm-o Bus. J., May 27, 1991 § 1, at 1.
2 Phillip I. Closms & Henry M. Schaffer, Involuntary Non-Servitude: The
Current Judicial Enforcement of Employee Covenants Not to Compete-A Proposal
for Reform, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 531, 532 (1984) (observing that covenants not to
compete are becoming a standard element of most employment contracts).
3 Ronald B. Coolley, Employment Agreements Provisions Definitions, Duties,
Covenants Not to Compete, Assignment After Ternunation and Severability, 14 AM.
INTELL. PROP. L. Ass'N QJ. 20 (1986) (alleging that in addition to being the most
important clause of an employment agreement, it is also the most difficult to draft);
see also Peter Whitmore, A Statistical Analysis of Noncompetition Clauses in
Employment Contracts, 15 J. CoRP. L. 483, 484 n.2 (1990) (arguing that it is now
almost malpractice per se not to add sucli a clause to an employment contract).
4 See Harlan M. Blake, Employment Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARv L.
REv. 625, 652 (1960) (stating that general knowledge, skill or facility acquired
through traimng or experience while working for an employer accrue solely to the
employee, even if the on the job training has been extensive or costly); Robert W.
Sikkel & Louis C. Rabaut, Michigan Takes a New Look at Trade Secrets and Non-
Compete Agreements, 64 MIcH. B. J. 1069, 1070 (1985).
5 All employees are under a common law duty not to compete with their
employers while working for the employer. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Powder Co. v.
Masland, 244 U.S. 100 (1917).
6 Steve D. Shadowen & Kenneth Voytek, Economic and Critical Analyses of the
Law of Covenants Not to Compete, 72 GEo. L.J 1425, 1426 (1984).
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the seller agree that he or she will not compete with the buyer.7 Second, in
many employment contracts, 8 the employer will require an employee to sign
an agreement stipulating that the employee will not compete with his or her
former employer after the employment relationship is terminated. Recognizing
that courts have developed two different standards9 for dealing with the two
types of covenants, this Article will only examine covenants not to compete in
the postemployment setting.
Noncompetition clauses in employment contracts have been the source of
litigation for over 500 years.' 0 Even after five centuries, however, the sea of
information on this topic is best summarized as "vast and vacillating,
overlapping and bewildering."" This confusion is due to the inherent conflict
between the basic contract policies on which these covenants rely The
judiciary, in adjudicating disputes involving covenants not to compete, must
continually balance one's freedom to contract against the general policy of
7 This Article does not address the use of covenants not to compete in the sale of
a business.
8 Covenants restricting postemployment opportunities in some professions are
illegal. See OHIO CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILrrY DR 2-108 (1992)
(prohibiting a lawyer from "participat[ing] in a partnership or employment agreement
with another lawyer that restricts the right of a lawyer to practice law after the
termination of a relationship created by the agreement, except as a condition to
payment of retirement benefits"); see also Williams v. Hobbs, 460 N.E.2d 287 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1983) (holding that a covenant restraining a physician from competing with
his former employer is unreasonable when the physician's services are vital to the
community); Paula Berg, Judicial Enforcement of Covenants Not to Compete Between
Physicians: Protecting Doctors' Interests at Patients' Expense, 45 RuTGERS L. REV. 1
(1992) (contending that covenants not to compete in physician contracts should be
invalid because they violate public policy).
9 Covenants have been treated differently in these two areas because of the
difference m bargaimng power. Courts more readily enforce covenants not to
compete incident to the sale of a business because a seller of a business has much
greater bargaining power than an employee. See C.T. Drechsler, Annotation,
Enforceability of Restrictive Covenant, Ancillary to Employment Contract, as Affected
by Duration Restrictions, 41 A.L.R.2d 15, 30-32 (1955); see also Alexander &
Alexander, Inc. v. Wohlman, 578 P.2d 530, 538 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978) (explaimng
that "the covenant might be reasonable ... as part of the sale of the business, but is
unreasonable when applied to employees").
10 Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARv L. REv.
625, 631 (1960) (asserting that the first significant case involving a noncompetition
covenant occurred in 1414).
11 Arthur Murray Dance Studios of Cleveland, Inc. v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685,
687 (Ohio C.P. 1952).
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abolishing contractual restraints on trade.12 The attempt to reconcile these two
policies has created an inconsistent body of case law as well as ambiguous
state statutes.
Most states, either through common law or statutory decree, have decided
that the best way to resolve the inherent policy conflicts within covenants not
to compete is to judge the covenant according to the doctrine of
"reasonableness." 13 But as Professor Corbin contends, "reasonableness is no
more absolute in character than is justice or morality "14 In spite of the
problems associated with the "reasonableness" standard, however, it appears
to be the most effective way to evaluate these agreements. 15
This Article is divided into three parts. Part I examines Ohio law
regarding noncompetition clauses. Ohio law on this topic is extensive and
more fully developed than most states. Part I explores how Michigan courts
adjudicate cases involving noncompetition clauses. In contrast to Ohio,
Michigan has minimal law on this topic. The dearth of Michigan law resulted
from a statutory prohibition on all noncompetition clauses. Although this ban
was lifted in 1985, little case law exists on this topic because the new statute is
not retroactive. Because the statute is not retroactive, pre-1985 covenants are
still unenforceable. However, litigation regarding covenants .not to compete
will increase significantly, as post-1985 covenants reach Michigan courts.
Part I concludes this Article by arguing that Michigan should adopt the
current Ohio standard for assessing the "reasonableness" of noncompetition
clauses. While both Michigan and Ohio enforce "reasonable" noncompetition
clauses, Ohio's judicially defined standard has created an effective list of
criteria by which to judge whether a covenant is reasonable. Michigan's
legislatively defined standard has no such criteria. Michigan should not repeat
12 Whitmore, supra note 3, at 486 (explaining that every time a covenant not to
compete clause is litigated the court must weigh one's freedom to contract against the
policy abhorring restraint of trade).
13 See id. at 487-88; see also MICH. CoM LAWS ANN. § 445.774a (West Supp.
1988) (adopting the rule of "reasonableness"); Briggs v. Butler, 45 N.E.2d 757 (Ohio
1942) (establishing the "reasonableness" doctrine in Ohio); David A. Cathcart &
Christopher I. Martin, Contracts with Employees: Covenants Not to Compete and
Trade Secrets, in 1 RESOURCE MATERIAL: LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 679 (Peter
M. Panken ed., 6th ed. 1989).
14 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CoRBiN ON CoNTRAcrs (one volume ed.) § 1, at 2
(1952).
15 See James R. Sprague, Making Employee Non-Competition Agreements
Unenforceable: Triumph of Labor Mobility or Policy Prescription for Disaster? Cases
of Ohio and California with Some Practical Suggestions, 17 CAP. U. L. REv. 391,
407 (1988) (arguing that Ohio's use of the "reasonableness" standard is the best
standard available).
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the protracted path that Ohio took to create these criteria. Instead, Michigan
should apply the current Ohio standard when adjudicating the
"reasonableness" of noncompetition clauses.
II. OHIO LAW ON COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE
A. The Origin of the "Reasonableness" Standard in Ohio
The roots of Ohio's current standard regarding noncompetition clauses are
grounded in the 1942 case of Briggs v. Butler.'6 In Briggs, the Ohio Supreme
Court adopted the "reasonableness" standard for judging when noncompetition
16 45 N.E.2d 757 (Ohio 1942). Thomas Briggs, under the trade name of The
Welcome Wagon Service Co., operated an advertising service. Charlotte Butler, at
the onset of her employment with Welcome Wagon, signed the following agreement:
Now, therefore, for and in consideration of this employment and the
compensation to be earned and paid to the hostess hereunder, the hostess
covenants and agrees (which covenant and agreement is the essence of this
contract) that she will not, during the term of this employment and for a period of
five whole years thereafter, engage, directly or indirectly, for herself, or as a
representative or employee of others, in the same kind or similar business, in
competition with [The Welcome Wagon Service Co.] in Toledo, Ohio, and/or m
any city, town, borough, township or other place in the United States and
Canada, in winch the company is then engaged in rendering its service.
Id. at 759-60. Butler eventually quit working for Welcome Wagon and started a
competing business. Welcome Wagon brought suit to enforce the agreement. The
Ohio Supreme Court found the covenant to be reasonable and enforced the covenant
as it applied to the City of Toledo but employed the blue pencil doctrine to strike the
additional area restrictions. Id.; see znfra notes 28-38 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the blue pencil doctrine.
E.P.I. of Cleveland, Inc. v Basler, 230 N.E.2d 552, 556 (Ohio Ct. App. 1967),
provides an interesting perspective on the Bnggs case:
Bnggs is one of a series of cases wich have been litigated in various
jurisdictions by the Welcome Wagon Hostess. Company (Briggs, President) with
varying results. The problem is common to all cases. Welcome Wagon hires a
hostess in a city to contact newcomers on behalf of merchants in the city, trams
her in the methods of acting as a hostess and then sues her on her contract when
she sets up a competing company . [The contracts were identical to Butler's
contract.] [Briggs v. Butler] is criticized in a federal court decision which struck
down entirely an identical covenant after comparing several Welcome Wagon
cases.
Id. (citing Welcome Wagon, Inc. v. Moms, 244 F.2d 693 (4th Cir. 1955)).
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clauses should be enforced. For a clause to be reasonable it must meet three
criteria: first, it must be necessary to protect the employer in some legitimate
business interest; second, the restraint must not be unduly harsh or oppressive
on the employee; and third, the restraint must not be injurious to the public.' 7
The Briggs court's analysis went beyond just determining the
reasonableness of the noncompetition clause. In dicta, the court planted the
seed for a problem that was to plague employers and the courts for thirty-three
years.' 8 This seed-that sprouted into a thorny problem-was the Briggs
court's contention that a clause in a covenant is either reasonable, and
consequently valid, or.unreasonable, and consequently invalid. 19 According to
Briggs, a court could not alter the terms of a clause to create a "reasonable"
covenant. Consequently, employers were forced to draft weak covenants that
often did not fully protect their interests. 20 It was better to draft a clause that
would assuredly be enforced and protect some interest, as opposed to a clause
that fully protected the employer's interests, but ran the risk of being totally
invalidated as unreasonable. Courts also experienced difficulty with applying
the Briggs standard and were forced to strike covenants as too broad, even
when the employer had some interests that deserved protection. 21
After Briggs, Ohio law on noncompetition agreements lay silent for ten
years until it was reawakened in the seminal case of Arthur Murray Dance
Studios of Cleveland, Inc. v. Witter.22 Because the parties stipulated that the
area and time of the restriction were reasonable,23 Arthur Murray did not help
to define what type of limitations are reasonable, The case is a significant
17 Briggs, 45 N.E.2d at 762. See znfra notes 24-35 and accompanying text
(illustrating that, although there are now many subparts within each criterion, these
three criteria are still used to assess the validity of noncompetition clauses).
18 See infra note 43 and accompanying text discussing the abolishment of the
blue pencil doctrine in Ohio.
19 Briggs, 45 N.E.2d at 763.
20 Sprague, supra note 15, at 393. The case intimates more lenient covenants in
Ohio may also be a result of the general decrease m the scope of covenants not to
compete throughout the country. See Whitmore, supra note 3, at 500 (explaining that
"current geographic [and] activity restraints usually are written more narrowly than
in the past").
21 See E.P.I. of Cleveland, Inc. v. Basler, 230 N.E.2d 552 (Ohio Ct. App.
1967) (intimating that the employer had some interest that deserved protection, but
the terms of the contract were too "definite" and interconnected to allow the court to
blue pencil specific clauses and accordingly, the court was forced to strike the entire
covenant as unreasonable).
22 105 N.E.2d 685 (Ohio C:P. 1952).
23 /d. at 691.
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noncompetition clause case, however, because Judge Hoover developed the
three criteria cited in Bnggs into a comprehensive, forty-one factor analysis.24
These factors, in part or in their entirety, have been cited by courts across the
country in assessing the validity of noncompetition clauses.25
24 Id. at 695-99 (requiring courts to examine the following: (1) whether the
employer has a protectible interest; (2) whether the covenant is ancillary or incidental
to some other transaction; (3) the object of the parties; (4) whether the object is to
remove ordinary competition; (5) whether the covenant is meant to discipline the
employee; (6) whether the agreement is meant to force the employee from the
business; (7) whether the covenant restricts skills the employee acquired through
courses provided by the employer; (8) the nature and extent of the employer's
business; (9) what the employee did for the employer; (10) how long the employee
worked for the employer; (11) whether the employer can easily replace the
employee; (12) the extent of the employee's contact with the customers; (13) how
many customers the employee knew; (14). whether this employee was the employer's
only contact with the customer; (15) whether the employee's contact with the
customer was reoccurring; (16) whether the customers would follow the employee;
(17) whether.the customers would know the employee quit; (18) the distance between
previous and prospective employers; (19) whether the employee worked at the
customer's premises; (20) whether the employee's work is a route or nonroute type;
(21) whether the employee's work involved solicitation; (22) the type of work the
employee intends to perform for the rival; (23) whether the employee intends to
solicit the employer's customers; (24) whether the employee actually entices
customers away; (25) the number of customers that left; (26) whether secret
employee lists are involved; (27) whether the employee knows "trade secrets;"
(28) whether the employee's new employment uses the acquired trade secrets;
(29) the territory the employer's business covers; (30) the territory the employee
covered; (31) the area the covenant restricts; (32) whether the agreement restricts an
area in which the employer does not do business; (33) whether the agreement bars
employment in an area the employee has never worked; (34) whether the restriction
applies to urban or rural areas; (35) the duration of the prohibition; (36) the character
of the work from which the employee is excluded; (37) the class of persons with
which the employee may not deal; "(38) the circumstances that require only
nonsolicitation; (39) whether 'fraud, bad faith, or other misconduct was present;
(40) whether there was there any actual damage; and (41) how many rivals are there
in the area).
Prior to Arthur Murray, most courts simply assessed a covenant's validity based
on the three criteria cited in Bnggs.
25 Fourteen states have cited Arthur Murray as the correct standard by which to
judge the reasonableness of a noncompetition clause. White Dairy Co. v. Davidson,
214 So.2d 416, 419 (Ala. 1968); Amex Distrib. Co. v. Mascari, 724 P.2d 596, 602
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1986); Evans Lab., Inc. v. Melder, 562 S.W.2d 62, 65 (Ark. 1978);
Newark Elec. v. Farber, 491 So.2d 350, 350 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Eastern
Distrib. Co. v Flynn, 567 P.2d 1371, 1376 (Kan. 1977); Follmer, Rudzewicz & Co.
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In essence, Arthur Murray reinforced the basic premises established in
Brggs-that each case must be decided based on its specific facts and no
bright line test can be used in evaluating a covenant's validity. 26 In theory, the
forty-one criteria list was widely accepted. In practice, however, the vast
number of criteria examined by Judge Hoover proved too cumbersome, and
most courts subsequent to Judge Hoover's opinion have based their decisions
on selected criteria from the list.27
Eight years later, the next significant noncompetition clause case arose. In
the 1964 case of Exine v. Williamson Midwest, Inc.,28 the Ohio Supreme
Court wrestled with the blue pencil rule established in Briggs. In Extine, the
court was asked to determine the validity of a contract clause that restricted the
employee from competing with the employer for two years after the
termination of the employment relationship. 29 The employer argued that either
the clause was reasonable or, in the alternative, that the court should reform
the clause to what the court thought to be reasonable. Although in line with
the growing trend of American case law,30 the latter choice was m direct
v. Kosco, 362 N.W.2d 676, 683 (Mich. 1984); Prentice v. Rowe, 324 S.W.2d 457,
461 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959); Technical Aid Corp. v. Allen, 591 A.2d 262, 269 (N.H.
1991); Solan Indus., Inc. v. Malady, 264 A.2d 53, 55 (N.J. 1970); Rem Metals
Corp. v. Logan, 565 P.2d 1080, 1082 (Or. 1977); Hayes v Altman, 266 A.2d 269,
271 (Pa. 1970); Martin v. Credit Protection Ass'n, 757 S.W.2d 24, 29 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1988); Richardson v. Paxton Co., 127 S.E.2d 113, 117 (Va. Ct. App. 1962).
2 6 Arthur Murray, 105 N.E.2d at 711. ("[A] covenant is not judged standing
alone but in relation to the contract and to the particular situation m which it is sought
to be enforced . . .).
27 See znfra notes 53-57 and accompanying text illustrating the reduced number
of factors courts examine in considering whether a covenant is reasonable.
28 200 N.E.2d 297 (Ohio 1964).
29 The Extine covenant read as follows:
In consideration of his employment by Employer, Employee agrees that on the
termination for any cause whatsoever of his said employment, he will not, within
two years after such terminiation, directly or indirectly, engage in the same or
similar or competitive line of business to that now carried on by Employer, either
on his own account or through or for or in behalf of any former employee of
Employer and that he will not, within said period of employment and two years
thereafter, in any way, directly or indirectly, divert or attempt to divert from
Employer any business whatsoever and particularly not by influencing or
attempting to influence any of the customers with whom he may have had
dealings.
Id. at 298.
30 See 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 289 (1963).
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opposition to the Briggs policy of simply striking or enforcing contractual
provisions. 31
The Extine court flirted with overruling the blue pencil doctrine of Bnggs,
but in the end, halfheartedly upheld the doctrine based solely on precedent.32
In an attempt to protect both the employer's and the employee's interests, the
court separated the Extine covenant into four clauses. 33 The first two clauses
were struck as unreasonable and the second two clauses were enforced as
reasonable restrictions. 34 The Extine court decided whether each of the four
clauses was reasonable based on a ten-factor analysis that the court developed
by combining and eliminating the forty-one criteria established by Judge
Hoover m Arthur Murray.35
By alleging that the clauses were severable, the Extine court was able to
enforce certain clauses while striking others.36 If the court had decided that the
clauses within the covenant were not severable, the entire covenant would
have been judged simply as either reasonable or unreasonable.37 Employers
31 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
32 Extine, 200 N.E.2d at 299 ("For the time being, at least, we believe that the
'blue-pencil' or partial invalidity test should apply.").
33 The court separated the covenant into the following four clauses: (1) the
employee would not engage in the same or similar competitive line of business on his
own account; (2) he would not engage in the same or similar line of business for a
competitor; (3) he would not divert or attempt to divert business from the employer;
and (4) he would not solicit the employer's present customers. Id.
3 4 Id. at 300. By striking the first two clauses, the covenant was essentially
emasculated: The employee was prevented only from soliciting the employer's
present customers.
35 The modified list of factors the Extine court employed in deciding whether the
covenant was reasonable is as follows: (1) the absence or presence of limitations as to
time; (2) the absence or presence of limiiations as to space; (3) whether the employee
represents the employer's sole contact with the customer; (4) whether the employee
possesses trade secrets; -(5) whether the covenant seeks to unduly limit competition;
(6) whether the covenant seeks to stifle the employee's inherent skill; (7) whether the
benefit to the employer is disproportional to the detriment to the employee; (8)
whether the employee's talent was developed while working for the employer; (9)
whether the covenant acts as a bar to the employee's only means of support; and (10)
whether the forbidden employment is only incidental to the main employment. Id. at
299.
36 Id.
37 See infra note 44 for a list of the states that judge the covenant's validity
based on the overall reasonableness of the entire covenant.
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took careful note of the Extine analysis and began drafting noncompetition
covenants with detailed and often repetitive subparts.38
In 1970, the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas presented Ohio
employers and employees with a case that had sobering ramifications for both
groups. In Patterson International Corp. v. Hemn,39 the court upheld a
covenant40 that restricted an employee from competing with his employer for
eighteen months in forty-five states. The case is significant for employees
because it is the most far-reaching geographic restriction to be upheld in Ohio.
From the employer's standpoint, the case is significant because it reminds
employers that enforcing noncompetition clauses is an action in equity The
court decided that the employee had breached the agreement and had derived
revenue from the breach, but refused to award the employer compensatory
damages because the employer had not paid the employee his last paycheck.41
Essentially, the employer's "unclean hands" prevented him from recovering
the lost revenue.
B. The Move Toward the Modern Standard
The modem standard governing the validity of noncompetition clauses in
Ohio was established by the Ohio Supreme Court in the 1975 case of
Raimonde v. Van Werah.42 In Rahnonde, the court overruled the thirty-three
38 See infra notes 40, 54 illustrating the detailed agreements that developed
subsequent to the Extine case.
39 264 N.E.2d 361 (Ohio C.P 1970).
40 The covenant, in relevant part, reads as follows:
EMPLOYEE shall not, during the period of his employment by EMPLOYER
and for a period of eighteen (18) months following termination of his
employment (whether such termination be with or without cause), either for
himself or on behalf of any person, firm, or corporation, directly or indirectly,
and in competition with EMPLOYER: (a) solicit, or attempt to divert from
EMPLOYER, the business of any of EMPLOYER'S customers or suppliers; or
(b) Engage in a business similar to EMPLOYER's in any of the following areas:
(45 states listed).
Id. at 362-63 (parentheses m original).
41 Patterson, 264 N.E.2d at 365 (granting the employer an injunction that
prevented the employee from continuing to breach the covenant).
42 325 N.E.2d 544 (Ohio 1975). In Raimonde, a veterinarian named Van Vlerah
signed a noncompetition agreement when he began practicing with Raimonde. The
agreement prohibited Van Vlerah from practicing for three years within a thirty mile
radius of Defiance, Ohio. Van Vlerah was dismissed after six months and began his
1994]
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year reign of the Briggs blue pencil doctrine by giving courts the power to
rewrite a covenant m order to make its terms reasonable.43 Specifically, the
court held that "[a] covenant not to compete which imposes unreasonable
restriction upon an employee will be enforced to the extent necessary to
protect an employer's legitimate interests." 44
Employers have welcomed this new doctrine with open arms because they
are now able to draft covenants that fully protect their interests without fear
that a court will completely strike any provisions deemed overbroad or
unreasonable. Employees, on the other hand have not been as enthralled with
the new doctrine, and contend that by allowing the court to rewrite overbroad
covenants, employers will draft severely restrictive contracts knowing that if
the court does not approve, the court will simply alter the covenant's terms. 45
This contention was dismissed by the Raimonde court as unfounded because
"[m]ost employers who enter contracts do so in good faith, and seek only to
protect legitimate interests." 46 Surprisingly, the Raumonde court's response
has proven fairly accurate over the last fifteen years; there are no reported
cases in which an Ohio court has been presented with patently unreasonable
restrictions. 47
Raunonde is most noted for overruling the blue pencil doctrine but,
perhaps more importantly, Raimonde also established that injunctive relief48
own veterinary practice in Defiance. The court enforced the covenant, but reduced
the thirty mile radius to eighteen miles.
43 Id. at 547.
44Id. Most states follow this approach. See Jeffrey G. Grody, Partial
Enforcement of Post-Employment Restrictive Covenants, 15 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PRoBS. 181 (1979). A few states, however, refuse to modify the covenant or to
selectively blue pencil the covenant: Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Maine, Nebraska,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and Wisconsin. Even fewer states blue pencil
covenants: Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, and West Virginia.
45 See, e.g., Raimonde, 325 N.E.2d at 547 *
46 Id.
47 If an employer creates *a patently unreasonable covenant, the court always has
the power to strike, rather than rewrite, the covenant. See Reddy v. Community
Health Found. of Man, 298 S.E.2d 906 (W Va. 1982) (stating that the court would
not rewrite or enforce any portion of a covenant not to compete that the court
determines to be "unreasonable" on its face); see also Fields Found. Ltd. v
Christensen, 309 N.W.2d 125 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981) (illustrating that the court will
not enforce a covenant clause that is oppressive or penal).
48 Efficiency requires breach of a covenant to be remedied by injunction rather
than damages. Enjoining a breach is the appropriate remedy for addressing a breach
because monetary damages are too difficult to compute. Damages are too difficult to
compute because:
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enforcing the contract should run from the time the judgment is entered, not
from when the employment relationship is terminated.49 The employee in
Raimonde argued that even if the three-year covenant was enforced, twenty-
eight of the thirty-six months had passed and the covenant could only be
enforced for another eight months. The Raimonde court wisely rejected this
contention, finding that to uphold such a policy would emasculate the clear
intent of the injunction. Instead, the court chose to enforce the covenant for
thirty-six months from the date of the judgment.50
Most covenants restrict the employee for less than two years after the
termination of the employment relationship. 51 Even in 1975, as illustrated by
Raimonde, it generally took longer than two years for the case to reach its
final resolution. Enforcing the injunction from the time of the judicial
resolution makes even more sense today in light of our clogged judiciary. 52
The most recent Ohio case involving a noncompetition clause provides a
solid blueprint for how Ohio courts should interpret noncompetition clauses in
employment contracts. In Rogers v. Runfola & Associates,53 the Ohio
Supreme Court was asked to enforce a covenant that enjoined the employees
from competing with the employer in the court reporting business for two
years within Franklin County.54 The court, applying a modified version of the
[Tihe court has no "market price" by which to measure the employer's damaggs.
The amount the employee earns by competing is not an appropriate measure
because it will have no necessary correlation to the damages sustained by the
employer. The decrease in, or the slowed increase in, the employer's profits is
not an appropriate measure because of the difficulty of proving a causal
relationship between the employee's breach and the amount of the employer's
profits.
Shadowen & Voytek, supra note 6, at 1432 (footnotes omitted).
4 9 Raimonde, 325 N.E.2d at 548.
50 One author speculates that a contrary decision would have been as logical as
"locking the barn door after the horse has been stolen." Eric J. Wittenberg, The
Practitioner's Guide to Ohio Covenant Not to Compete and Trade Secrets Law in
Post-Employment Context, 18 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 833, 862 (1992) (quoting Premux,
Inc. v. Zappitelli, 561 F. Supp. 269, 278 (N.D. Olno 1983)).
51 Whitmore, supra note 3, at 515 (calculating that the average covenant
restriction is 24.5 months with an average enforcement of 21.3 months).
52 See Andre W. Fegelman, Judge Aims To Cut Back Court Delays, CHI. TRiB.,
May 6, 1992, at C9 (explaining delays of six to seven years are not uncommon
before a case reaches trial).
53 565 N.E.2d 540 (Ohio 1991).
54 The covenants contained the following restrictions:
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Raimonde standard, rewrote the covenant to what it believed was reasonable.
When the court was finished, the covenant restricted the employees for a
period of one year and only within the city limits of Columbus.
Rogers reiterated that courts must examine whether a covenant is
reasonable with respect to the three criteria established in Bnggs: first, it must
be necessary to protect the employer in some legitimate business interest;
second, the restraint must not be unduly harsh or oppressive on the employee;
and third, the restraint must not be injurious to the public.55 If the court
decides that the covenant is unreasonable with respect to any of these three
criteria, it is to fashion a reasonable covenant between the employer and the
employee. In so doing, the court must consider the following eight factors:
whether the employee represents the sole contact with the customer; whether
the employee is possessed with confidential information or trade secrets;
whether the covenant seeks to eliminate competition which would be unfair to
the employer or merely seeks to eliminate ordinary competition; whether the
covenant seeks to stifle the inherent skill and experience of the employee;
whether the benefit to the employer is disproportional to the detriment to the
employee; whether the covenant operates as a bar to the employee's sole
means of support; whether the employee's talent which the employer seeks to
suppress was actually developed during the period of employment; and
whether the forbidden employment is merely incidental to the main
employment. 56
If blue penciling was still the policy in Ohio, the covenant in Rogers
would probably have been found unreasonable. Consequently, the entire
covenant would have been stricken because the court would not have been able
to rewrite the covenant in order to make it reasonable. Instead of striking the
covenant in such a manner the court, using the above listed criteria, was better
able to efficiently provide equity to both parties.
As in Raimonde, the employee argued that because the restrictive period
had run, an injunction could not be enforced. The Rogers court, relying on
(a) During the term of this Contract and for a period of two (2) years
thereafter, [Rogers and Marrone] will not engage in the court reporting and
(or) public stenography business as an employee, sole proprietor, independent
contractor, partner, joint-venturer or prmcipal at any place within the limits of
Franklin County, Ohio, without the express written consent of the Employer.
Id. at 541 n.1.
55 Id. at 543 (citing Raimonde v. Van Vlerah, 325 N.E.2d 544 (Ohio 1975) (first
two paragraphs of the syllabus)).
56 Id. (citing Raimonde, 325 N.E.2d at 547).
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Raimonde, rejected this contention and enforced the one year covenant starting
sixty days from the date of the judgment.5 7
C. The Present Standard
The most significant change m the law involving Ohio noncompetition
covenants is the replacement of the blue pencil doctrine with the power of the
court to rewrite the covenant in reasonable terms. Yet, after fifty-one years of
litigation, it still is not clear what "reasonable" means. Ohio courts have
upheld geographic restrictions that canvass almost the entire United States,58
but have invalidated, as overbroad, covenants that include only Franklin
County.5 9 Paralleling this ambiguity m geographic restrictions is the
uncertainty as to how long the covenant may reasonably run. Ohio courts have
upheld covenants that last for five years,60 yet have invalidated covenants that
are only two years long.61 While seemingly erratic and unpredictable, this is
exactly the result the Briggs court hoped to achieve when it started down the
"reasonable" path. 62 Each case was to be evaluated on its individual facts and
no bright-line test was to be provided. Clearly, no bright-line test is present,
but based on Raimonde and its progeny, employers and employees now have
some indication of the factors the court will examine m making its decision.
III. MICHIGAN LAW ON COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE
Michigan law surrounding covenants not to compete63 evolved in a much
different manner than did its Ohio counterpart. The law in Michigan and Ohio
57 1d. at 544.
58 Patterson Int'l Corp. v. Heron, 264 N.E.2d 361 (Ohio C.P 1970) (enforcing
a covenant that covered 45 states).
59 Rogers v. Runfola & Assocs., Inc., 565 N.E.2d 540 (Ohio 1991) (reducing a
covenant's geographic scope from Franklin County to the city limits of Columbus).
60 Briggs v. Butler, 45 N.E.2d 757 (Ohio 1942) (enforcing a five-year
covenant); Toulmm v. Becker, 124 N.E.2d 778 (Ohio Ct. App. 1954) (enforcing a
five-year covenant).
61 Rogers, 565 N.E.2d 540 (enforcing a two-year covenant for only one year).
62 Bnggs, 45 N.E.2d at 761 (contending that the scope of a covenant is
"dependent upon the nature and extent of the business and the nature and extent of
the service of the employee in connection therewith and other pertinent conditions").
63 Michigan law regarding trade secrets evolved independently from the law
addressing covenants not to compete. This Article addresses only covenants not to
compete. For a detailed explanation of how Michigan addresses trade secrets, see E.
Frank Cornelius, Supreme Court, Legislature Say "Yes" To Miclugan's Trade Secrets,
64 U. DET. L. Rnv. 1 (1986).
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developed differently primarily because Ohio allowed the courts to decide how
to handle the covenants, while Michigan chose to legislatively address the
situation.64 Judicial control allowed Ohio to take a more dynamic and
progressive approach to changes m this area of the law 65 Conversely, the
Michigan statute governing this area stifled any expansion or change in
noncompetition covenants by rendering all such covenants illegal and void. 66
From the statute's enactment in 1905 to its repeal m 1985,67 this area of the
law did not develop in Michigan. Legislative reaction is often slower than
judicial change and, as a result, Michigan law in this area is in its infancy.
64 Other states have also legislatively addressed covenants not to compete with
varying degrees of success. See ALA. CODE § 8-1-1 (1975); COLO. REv. STAT. § 8-2-
113(2) (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542.339 (West Supp. 1982); HAw. REv STAT.
§ 480-4 (1976); LA. RaV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921 (West 1964); MICH. COMP LAWS
§§ 28-2-703 to 705 (1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-2 (1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-
08-06 (1975); OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, §§ 217-19 (1971); OR. REV. STAT. § 653.295
(1981-82); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 53-9-8 to 11 (1980); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 103.465 (West 1974).
65 See Sprague, supra note 15, at 407 (alleging that Ohio's "reasonableness"
doctrine has created a thorough and practical solution to cases involving
noncompetition clauses).
66 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.761 (1979), repealed by 1984 MICH. PUB. AcTs
274 (codified at MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 445.771 to .788 (West Supp. 1988))
("All agreements and contracts by which any person, co-partnership or corporation
promises or agrees not to engage m an avocation, employment, pursuit, trade,
profession or business, whether reasonable or unreasonable, partial or general,
limited or unlimited, are hereby declared to be against public policy and are illegal
and void.").
There were three key exceptions to this general prohibition. First, there was an
exception that allowed a seller of a business to contractually limit himself or herself
from competing with the purchaser of his or her previous business. This exception
was created through two statutory provisions: First, § 445.731 provided that "nothing
in this act shall be construed to impair or invalidate agreements or contracts known to
the common law and in equity as those relating to good will of trade." Second,
§ 445.766 stated that "[tihis act shall not apply to any contract mentioned in this act,
nor in restraint of trade where the only object of restraint imposed by the contract is
to protect the vendee, or transferee . . . ." The second exception to the general
prohibition allowed employers to restrict their employees from disclosing "route
lists" for 90 days after their employment terminated. Id. § 445.766. The third
exception allowed an employer to protect trade secrets. See supra note 63.
67 Section 445.761 was repealed by the Michigan Antitrust Reform Act. MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.771 to .788 (West Supp. 1988).
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In 1985, the legislature passed the Michigan Antitrust Reform Act
("MARA"), 6s which repealed the 1905 statute prohibiting noncompetition
covenants. Because of the confusion surrounding whether postemployment
covenants not to compete were legal after 1985, the MARA was amended two
years later to specifically allow courts to enforce reasonable covenants not to
compete. 69 To be enforced, consequently, the covenant must be reasonable as
to duration, geographical area, and type of employment or line of busmess. 70
If the covenant is found to be unreasonable, the court may rewrite the
covenant in order to make it reasonable. The statute, however, only applies to
covenants written after 1985. Thus, by statutory decree, Michigan ended the
eighty years of silence in this area. Unlike Ohio, however, there is no
indication as to what factors the court will consider in making the
reasonableness determination. 71
Prior to 1985, it was easy for Michigan attorneys to deal with covenants
not to compete: all such covenants were illegal and void. Unless the court
considered the information the employee possessed to be a trade secret, the
employee had an unrestricted choice of where he went to work and with whom
he competed. There was no problem of what to do with overbroad covenants.
As Michigan Supreme Court Chief Justice Williams wrote in his dissent in
Woodward v. Cadillac Overall Supply Co.. "[T]here is no authority in
68 1984 MIcH. PuB. Acrs 274 (codified as amended at MICH. COMP LAWS
ANN. §§ 445.771 to .788 (West Supp. 1988)).
69 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.774a. (West Supp. 1988) This subsection
provides as follows:
(1) An employer may obtain from an employee an agreement or covenant which
protects an employer's reasonable competitive business interest and expressly
prohibits an employee from engaging in employment or a line of business after
termination of employment if the agreement or covenant is reasonable as to its
duration, geographical area, and the type of employment or line of business. To
the extent any such agreement or covenant is found to be unreasonable in any
respect, a court may limit the agreement to render it reasonable in light of the
circumstances in which it was made and specifically enforce the agreement as
limited.
(2) This section shall apply to covenants and agreements which are entered into
after March 29, 1985.
Id.
70 See id. for the specific language of the statute.
71 See Sikkel & Rabaut, supra note 4, at 1070 (questioning whether Michigan
will enforce any noncompetition covenants and, if so, what standard of review will be
applied).
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Michigan as to the treatment of overbroad covenants not to compete ancillary
to an employment contract partially for the simple reason that any such
covenant, no matter how limited, has been illegal.. since 1905."72 With the
1985 statutory allowance for reasonable covenants, these covenants will now
be a source of potential litigation.
The present statute allows for protection of an employer's legitimate
business interest. An important question that the statute does not clearly
answer, however, is what type of interests are protectible. The original version
of House Bill 4072,73 on which the current statute regarding employment
covenants is based, provided a more detailed explanation of exactly what type
of interests the employer could protect.74 The original Bill allowed an
employer to protect trade secrets and to protect the employee from using skills
that are special, unique, or extraordinary to the employer's business. This Bill
was a conglomeration of New York's statute on covenants not to compete75
and the Restatement of Contracts.76 One author speculates that the original
72 Woodward v. Cadillac Overall Supply Co., 240 N.W.2d 710, 718 (Mich.
1976).
73 Mich. H.B. 4072, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1987).
74 House Bill 4072 read as follows:
(1) An employer shall not obtain from any employee an agreement or covenant,
express or implied, which prohibits the employee from engaging in any
employment or line of business after the termination of the employment
relationship unless 1 or more of the following apply to the covenant or
agreement:
(a) Its purpose is to prohibit the disclosure of trade secrets.
(b) Its purpose is to prohibit the employee from soliciting the clients or
customers of the employer for not more than ninety days after termination of the
employment relationship.
(c) Its contents pertain to employee services which are special, unique, or
extraordinary
(2) As used in this section, an employee's services are "special, unique, or
extraordinary" if the employee participates in policy-making decisions and has
had access to corporate planning material or confidential employment materials.
Id.
75 E. Frank Cornelius, Michigan's Law of Trade Secrets and Covenants Not to
Compete: Chapter Two, 66 U. DET. L. Rnv. 33, 37 (1988).
76 Id. at 38.
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form of this Bill was altered because it was too broad m some respects and too
narrow in others. 77 It was allegedly too broad in its scope with the special,
unique, or extraordinary language and too narrow m the number of protectible
interests.78 Although the legislature enacted the law, it left to the courts the
job of defining what interests an employer may protect.
A key question is whether an employer's investment in employee training
is a protectible interest. Neither the statute nor case law provides an answer to
this question. Various authors have reached divergent answers by interpreting
the statute's legislative history in two different ways. One possible answer
relies on the assumption that the Michigan legislature refused to enact House
Bill 4072 because the listing of specific protectible interests was too
restrictive. 79 If one relies on this assumption, employee training is probably a
protectible interest. The second possible answer relies on the premise that,
although the legislature refused to enact the original Bill as presented, it did
not intend to create a broad interpretation of the type of interest that is
protectible. 80 This premise is based on the "profoundly negative effect which
covenants not to compete can have on employees in particular and on business
and commerce in general." 81 If one relies on the second premise, employee
training is probably not a protectible interest.82 This issue has not been
addressed by a Michigan court and either interpretation is equally tenable.
Litigation surrounding covenants not to compete should begin to increase
in Michigan. It is now established that the MARA does not apply retroactively
to covenants entered into prior to March 29, 1985. Although one federal
district court applied the MARA statute retroactively, 83 all Michigan case law
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 See Michael F. Golab, Employee Non-Competition Agreements, 67 MICH. B.
1. 388, 389 (1988) (contending that the court will balance and respect an employer's
investment in employee training and other proprietary information that does not
qualify as a trade secret).
80 See Cornelius, supra note 75, at 41-42 (alleging that it is "doubtful that an
expansive interpretation of 'an employer's reasonable business interests' was
intended" to include employee training).
81 Id. at 41.
82 This contention is also strengthened by Kubik, Inc. v Hull, 224 N.W.2d 80,
96 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974) (arguing that uniqueness is not sufficient to create a trade
secret). Although Kubik dealt with trade secrets and was decided prior to 1985, when
noncompetition covenants were invalid, it still provides a valuable indication of how
Michigan courts will examine employee training.
83 Thompson Recruitment Advertising, Inc. v. Wedes, 651 F. Supp. 107, 109
(E.D. Mich. 1986) (applying the law in effect at the time the cause of action arose).
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indicates that because the statute is substantive rather than remedial,8 4 it does
not apply to any covenants entered into prior to its enactment. The most recent
federal case has followed this line of Michigan case law and has denied
retroactive application of the MARA.85
Case law prior to 1905 may provide some indication as to what type of
factors Michigan courts will consider when assessing whether a covenant is
reasonable. Pre-1905 case law identifies four factors that must be examined in
judging whether a covenant is reasonable: first, whether the agreement is for a
"just and honest purpose;" second, whether the agreement seeks to protect a
legitimate business interest; third, whether the agreement is reasonable
between the parties; and fourth, whether the agreement is injurious to the
public.86 While these factors date back to the nineteenth century, they are still
cited in current court opimons.8 7 Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that
they will be incorporated into the assessment of whether a covenant is
reasonable.
To date, only one case involving a post-1985 noncompetition covenant has
reached the courts.88 In Robert Half International, Inc. v. Van Steenis, an
84 See Compton v Lepack, 397 N.W.2d 311 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986):
When an agreement or contract is entered into in violation of the statute, repeal
of that statute does not make the agreement valid because the Legislature cannot
validate a contract which never had a legal existence; [the only exceptions to this
rule are if the repealing statute] expressly or impliedly states that it validates
previously invalid agreements or if the repealed statute affects only the remedy.
Id. at 316.
See also Cardiology Assocs. v. Zenka, 400 N.W.2d 606 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985)
(contending that the law existing at the time the covenant was entered into was
applicable to determine the validity of the covenant).
85 Shipley Co. v. Clark, 728 F. Supp. 818 (D. Mass. 1990) (refusing to transfer
a case from Massachusetts to Michigan because Michigan's public policy against
enforcing pre-1985 noncompetition woulid render the covenant invalid).
86 Hubbard v. Miller, 27 Mich. 15, 19 (1873).
87 See Follmer, Rudzewicz & Co. v. Kosco, 362 N.W.2d 676, 684 (Mich. 1984)
(citing Hubbard as the correct standard by which the court would judge the
reasonableness of a covenant).
88 Robert Half Int'l, Inc. v. Van Steems, 784 F. Supp. 1263 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
In Robert Half, the employer was an employment recruitment agency with various
offices in the Detroit and Ann Arbor area. When Van Steems began working for
Robert Half m 1988, he signed a noncompetition agreement that restricted him, upon
termination of the employment relationship, from working for one year within a fifty-
mile radius of three of Robert Half's offices. In 1991, Van Steems quit working for
Robert Half and immediately began to work for a competing recruitment agency. The
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employer sought to enforce a noncompetition covenant that restricted a former
employee from working for one year within a fifty-mile radius of three of the
employer's offices.89 In reaching its decision, the court did not employ or list
any factors which could be used by future courts in deciding other
noncompetition clause cases. The court simply stated that, based on the facts
of this case, fifty miles and one year are reasonable.
While Robert Half embodies the spirit of Briggs9°-that each case must be
evaluated on its individual facts and no bright-line test is available-it does
little to help define what restrictions are reasonable. In essence, this case
restates section 445.774a of the MARA and then declares that the
noncompetition clause is reasonable. Employers and the courts still have little
indication of what factors to consider when drafting and adjudicating
noncompetition clauses.
By enacting the MARA and its subsequent amendment, the Michigan
legislature acknowledged that employment conditions have changed markedly
since 1905 and that the law must adapt to this change. 91 While MARA was a
step in the right direction, it still will be many years before employers will
know what provisions will be considered reasonable.
competing agency was located across the street from Robert Half's office in Troy,
Michigan. Robert Half filed suit against Van Steenis seeking specific enforcement of
the noncompetition agreement. Id. at 1264-70.
89 Robert Half alleged that Van Steems not only breached the noncompetition
covenant, but also used trade secrets-confidential books, papers, and appointment
calendars-that he had taken with him when he quit working for Robert Half. Id.
Because of the second allegation, this case could have been decided as a trade secret
case without the need to interpret the noneompetition covenant. As noted earlier,
Michigan has consistently given the employer greater protection when trade secrets
are involved. See Cornelius, supra note 63.
90 See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Bnggs
case.
91 As the court noted, however, in Kelsey-Hayes Co. v. Maleki, 765 F. Supp
402 (E.D. Mich. 1991), "[t]he advance made by the 1987 enactment clearly does not
remove such covenants from disfavored status, and narrowly limits them to
'reasonableness' in protecting only a competitive interest, duration, geographic area,
and type of employment." Id. at 406. In Kelsey, the court refused to enforce a
covenant not to compete because the covenant sought to restrict only normal
competition. The court held that an employer's legitimate business interests "must be
something greater than mere competition, because a prohibition of all competition is
in restraint of trade.. . ." Id. at 407.
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IV. WHY MICH[GAN SHOULD ADOPT THE OIo STANDARD
While Michigan draws from a statutorily defined standard, and Ohio
draws from a judicially created standard, there should be significant similarity
m the results. Michigan law is just beginning to evolve in this area because,
while Ohio law developed slowly and methodically from Briggs to Rogers,
Michigan law, until 1985, lay dormant under its legislatively imposed blanket.
As Michigan law awakens, it should adopt the lessons learned by Ohio.
Michigan should adopt the present factors that Ohio applies in assessing
whether noncompetition clauses ae reasonable. Michigan, in essence, has
already started down the same path Ohio took in the 1942 case of Briggs v.
Butler.92 Michigan embarked down the Briggs path in the 1984 case of
Follmer, Rudzewkcz & Co. v. Kosco.93 In assessing the validity of a contract
provision similar to a covenant not to compete,94 the Michigan Supreme Court
held that the restraint was reasonable based on the same three criteria Briggs
applied fifty years ago.95 Through trial and error, embodied in fifty years of
case law, Ohio courts have modified the Briggs standard to create the clear,
92 In Follmer, Rudzewicz & Co. v. Kosco, 362 N.W.2d 676 (Mich. 1984), the
Michigan Supreme Court decided the validity of a contract clause based on whether
the agreement protected a valid business interest of the employer, whether the
agreement was unduly burdensome on the employee, and whether the agreement was
injurious to the public. Id. at 683. The Follmer court cited Hubbard v. Miller, 27
Mich. 15, 19 (1873), as the source of this standard, but these are the same three
interests cited in Brzggs. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text for the
standard used in Briggs.
93 362 N.W.2d 676. Folimer dealt with two cases consolidated on appeal. The
court's reasomng applies equally to both cases.
94 The Follmer provision reads as follows:
If, at any time within three (3) years after the termination or expiration hereof,
Employee directly or indirectly services any client of Employer, he shall
unmediately purchase from Employer .he goodwill associated with such client. In
view of the difficulty in evaluating goodwill, it shall be measured by [a certain
formula], but in no event, less than Two Thousand ($2,000) Dollars for each
such client.
Id. at 678 n.1.
The Michigan Supreme Court held that the Follmer clause was not a covenant
not to compete, thereby not violating the statute that prohibited such agreements. The
court reasoned that the agreement did not prevent the employee "'from engaging in
his chosen profession' nor 'from openly and notoriously competing with plaintiff.'"
Id. at 678.
95 See supra note 17 and accompanying text for the three criteria cited in Bnggs.
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concise standard applied in Rogers.96 In deciding whether a covenant is
reasonable, Michigan should not labor through fifty years of case law, but
should simply adopt the Rogers standard.
Adopting the current Ohio standard would be logical, therefore, because
both states allege to apply the "reasonable" standard, neither blue pencil
unreasonable clauses, and both allow the court to rewrite covenants that are
deemed unreasonable. If Michigan courts adopt the current Ohio standard for
judging whether a noncompetition clause is reasonable, employers and
employees would have a clear indication of the factors the court would use in
assessing a covenant's validity. The benefits of this knowledge would be
twofold. First, employers could draft noncompetition clauses that would not
be unduly burdensome on the employee, yet would protect the employer's
entire interests. Second, Michigan courts could avoid the multitude of cases
that were necessary to form the current Ohio standard.
Michigan law regarding covenants not to compete will continue to evolve
as employment agreements entered into after 1985 are brought before the
Michigan courts. As such cases come to trial, Michigan courts will be forced
to define what is "reasonable." The most logical approach is for Michigan to
adopt the definition of "reasonable" created through Ohio's case law
96 See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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